Nuclear Material Accounting and Control of Non-Proliferation in Ghana

Abstract

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat that also urges cooperation of safeguards at all levels. Safeguards is not restricted only to verify the declared nuclear materials but also to give transparent and confidential information about the nuclear fuel cycle and related activities to confirm the absence of undeclared activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in States. In view of this only strong SSAC with enhanced capabilities, activities and rights can meet this demand. Ghana is a signatory of both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Protocol Additional (to the CSA) in connection with the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) since 17th February, 1975. This gives Ghana the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty (NFCIRC/226). Under this Agreement the Government of Ghana also establishes and maintains a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards. The current Radiation Protection Board has been successfully upgraded into a competent regulatory body referred to as the Ghana Nuclear Regulatory Authority (GNRA) on 1st April, 2014 by the Nuclear Authority Bill Act (2014) and preparations are underway to make it fully independent. The National Nuclear Research Institute (NNRI) of the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission is presently in charge of Safeguards activities. The GHARR-1 facility has received fresh fuel only one time (from the People’s Republic of China supplier) in 1991 and was made critical in 1995. GHARR-1 has not generated any spent fuel till now. The inventories of nuclear materials at GHARR-1 include approximately 980.40 grams of uranium enriched to approximately 90.2 per cent by weight in the isotope uranium-235. In Ghana, current activities under the safeguards agreement are functioning smoothly without any constraints. Having attained the broader safeguards conclusion, Ghana must continue to work diligently to maintain it by reinforced collaboration with the IAEA. This paper discusses the current safeguards implementation system in Ghana and provides recommendations necessary to enhance the country’s State System of Accounting procedures to combat proliferation.
Keywords: Proliferation, safeguards, nuclear material, accounting
Cite this Article: Appiah ER, Gbadago JK. Nuclear Material Accounting and Control of Non-Proliferation in Ghana. Journal of Nuclear Engineering & Technology. 2015; 5(1): 1–7p.